

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INCREASING COMBAT SUPPORT AND
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS
IN THE U.S. MILITARY

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Department of Defense effort to downsize the military created a significant reliability on contractors for Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) within a theater of operations. The military is in now undergoing dramatic transformation of its forces. Therefore, it has an option to buy back the CS and CSS support required for high intensity conflict. Several studies in the past assert an economic benefit by outsourcing CS and CSS capabilities to maximize the number of combat troops available for deployment. This study focuses on CS and CSS issues related to soldier support and survivability as opposed to the pure financial benefit of outsourcing. This study also examines the negative impact of contracting core military support competencies. This strategic research paper discusses some of the problems with the existing military/contractor force mix. It proposes reallocating CS and CSS units in the Active Component and Reserve Component to support the full spectrum of operational support requirements of one major regional high intensity conflict for a five division scenario. This is based on Operation Iraqi Freedom while additionally meeting the scheduled rotational requirements of the force.

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INCREASING COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

PROBLEM

Since the early 1990s, the United States (U.S.) military has deactivated a significant portion of its combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units resulting in the loss of critical skills, operational readiness and combat capability. This transformation has resulted in requiring military units to remain self sufficient for greater periods of time while simultaneously increasing that same unit's reliability on contracts and contractors for supplies and support. The Department of Defense (DoD) has placed greater reliability on contractor support for military deployments. However, contractor support cannot perform equally to military units in high intensity conflict. The military must reinvest in additional CS and CSS units to support the full spectrum of operational requirements of high intensity conflict.

The purpose of this research paper is to support increasing the numbers of CS and CSS units across all military services and eliminate or minimize using large logistics contracts to support the U.S. military in high intensity conflict areas.

BACKGROUND

"The U.S. military has relied on contractors to provide supplies and services in support of contingency operations since the Revolutionary War."¹ During the last decade, the DoD has increasingly invested heavily in utilizing contractors to provide logistical support of U.S military deployments throughout the world. DoD initiated this policy to replace capabilities lost during the military drawdown in the 90s. This drawdown reduced not only uniformed personnel, but the supporting civilian workforce as well. The current DoD policy requires significant reliance on CS and CSS to the military through civilian contract sources.

As the drawdown started to take effect, each military branch was forced to resort to employing contractors to fill the support void. The Army first awarded the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in 1992. The Navy awarded the Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP) in 1995 and the Air Force followed suit with the Air Force Contractor Augmentation Program (AFCAP) contract in 1997.²

The Army's LOGCAP was an initiative to pre-plan CS and CSS requirements during peacetime, and regulate the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime and other contingencies to augment U.S forces. The intent was to utilize contractors to release military units for other purposes and provide logistics services and construction and engineering support within reduced cost.³ The current LOGCAP is a cost-plus award fee contract. In other words, performing an unspecified amount of work at cost plus performance based financial

incentives for profit. The Air Force AFCAP and the Navy CONCAP Programs were both initiated to enhance/augment organic capabilities and require the contractors to provide a specific set of services for a fee which was very similar to LOGCAP. The most essential purpose of the contracting programs was to minimize CS and CSS troop strength in an effort to provide greater numbers of trigger pulling combat troops as a proportion of the military. However, due to excessive contracting, the military is losing it's capability to support and defend itself during wartime. Logistic support contracts are a necessary requirement to augment deployed U.S. military units. But, the military must reincorporate CS and CSS units back into the military to support itself during high intensity conflict.

CURRENT POLICY

The current policy augments organic military support units during deployment operations in an effort to reduce the ratio of support personnel relative to supported personnel. However, the military has moved contracting into providing support for core competencies. This policy relies excessively on contractors to provide significant levels of support for fuel transport and distribution, food delivery and meals, water, sewer, laundry, waste disposal, and puts base maintenance and repair into the hands of a contracted workforce. Current policy allows for contracts negotiated during peacetime with contingency clauses for use in a theater of war.

ADVANTAGES

The current policy provides for a smaller standing military thereby reducing manpower costs which are the most expensive portion of the budget. Additionally, a smaller military requires less equipment; thereby, reducing the requirement to buy and maintain large volumes of expensive equipment. Minimizing the CS and CSS footprint also allows a larger percentage of the military to be in combat arms units. With the reduction in Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) military and civilian personnel, DoD theoretically sees an equal reduction in the payroll. This may enhance the military's ability to transform faster within its limited budgetary constraints. The reduction in support positions allows the military to increase the number of deployable combat personnel without increasing the total end strength. The increased integration of civilian contract personnel with the military would allow the U.S. to maintain the proper combat force/support force mix, in a specific area or operation, without violating previously arranged troop ceilings or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It would also allow for a decreased military presence in what may be a sensitive situation without the loss of proper 'creature comforts'. The smaller force might also have the added benefit of allowing soldiers to rotate on shorter tours.

The smaller military presence is of great importance when our government or a foreign government caps the number of military personnel allowed in a particular theater or country. This means we can deploy enough combat troops to deal with the threat while using contractors to provide support services to minimize the total number of soldiers deployed. This also allows DoD to use contractors to conserve scarce skills in high-demand, low-density units to ensure they will be available for future deployments.⁴

LOGCAP has had its successes. In East Timor in 1997, LOGCAP contractor DynCorp supported the United States Pacific Command staff in planning for and providing helicopter and engineering support at the Comoro Airfield runway in support of U.S. peacekeepers. East Timor had few resources. Therefore, DynCorp was forced to bring in equipment, materiel and skilled labor. DynCorp worked diligently to deploy and construct prior to the monsoon season, 400 miles from the nearest Australian port and within an area of significant Indonesian influence. The contractor then transitioned to a new mission of providing life support. "The East Timor mission has been rated a total success. The efforts by the contractors there have validated the fundamental LOGCAP concept that the United States can support its overseas commitments without always having to use military assets."⁵ The success in East Timor reinforces the use of contractors in support of the military in low intensity conflict.

However, to support this, DoD must start including contractors in the Human Capital Strategic Plan (HCSP). The HCSP is the DoD strategic plan that maps out human resources programs, systems and practices in DoD. The strategic plan imparts the Department's direction, with its vision, values, principles, critical success goals and objectives. This plan is prepared to look forward over the life of the Program Objective Memorandum cycle and will be updated as significant events and achievements are accomplished and new requirements added.

Integrating contractors into the HCSP could facilitate focusing DoD's personnel resources in the areas that contribute to war fighting and relying on the private sector to provide non-core functions.⁶ Once the situation stabilizes, contractor execution of certain non-combat types of work would allow for a smoother transition to host nation support. Contractor use of the local assets has a tendency to immediately stimulate the local economy. The immediate incorporation of local personnel and equipment in Iraq led to the pacification of entire geographical regions allowing people to get back to their normal lives.

DISADVANTAGES

The military is losing or has lost the ability to support itself.

The increasing reliance on the private sector to handle certain functions and capabilities has further reduced or eliminated the military's ability to meet certain requirements internally.....for, example, the Air Force and the Navy use commercial communications systems at deployed locations in Southwest Asia and support this equipment with contractors. According to one Navy official with whom we spoke, the Navy uses contractors because it does not train its personnel to maintain commercial systems.⁷

One of the current problems with large logistics support contracts is that none of the services are identifying essential contractor services.⁸ According to a United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report in June 2003, prior to the known costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), DoD has little control over the vast sums of money pumped into the LOGCAP Program. "Neither DoD nor the services have a single point that collects information on contracts to support deployed forces. As a result, DoD could provide no information on the total cost of contractor support to deployed forces. The GAO report also noted that prior to OIF "based on the information and contracts we obtained during our review, we estimate that the costs of contractor support to deployed forces will exceed \$4.5 billion for the period fiscal years 2000 through 2005."⁹ Unfortunately, this report did not compare the cost of contractors versus the cost of military personnel. But, the planned execution of \$4.5 billion for LOGCAP can buy back several thousand military personnel.

The LOGCAP contract is growing excessively. The initial size and scope of the OIF contract was \$4.5 billion.¹⁰ However, "The current LOGCAP contract is for \$8.6 billion."¹¹ The contract was written in advance of OIF. Therefore, anything encountered requiring different or additional support requires a contract modification or a change order. For instance the 30 May 2003 Basic Statement of Work for task order 59 was changed seven times from 7 June 2003 to 14 November 2003. The changes were as simple as adding additional sites and additional services to existing sites. Task Order 29 for support in Kuwait was changed 18 times from September 2002 through December 2003, including five changes in one month, some on consecutive days. As of 11 May 2004, the contracting office, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and the contractor processed more than 176 modifications to LOGCAP task orders. Frequent revisions to task orders generate a significant amount of rework for the contractor and the contracting officer not to mention the additional cost for the modifications.¹² This extra work, loss of time and additional cost can be eliminated by the reincorporation of military support units.

The magnitude of these contracts and the ambiguousness of the deliverables makes the contracts difficult to manage for both the contractor and the government and may require months for full contractor mobilization. In many instances, the contractor can be slow to react initially and then take several months to catch up once it gets support to the field. Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) has the existing contract to provide support to the U.S. Army in Iraq starting in 2003. KBR took months to mobilize and deploy and was weeks and even months behind the delivery schedule for many of the support requirements for OIF.

These mega contracts make waste almost inevitable.

KBR charged \$2.27 a gallon for unleaded gasoline, including transportation from Kuwait. Another contractor charged \$1.18 a gallon for unleaded gasoline, including transportation from Turkey. Defense auditors do not believe KBR did an adequate subcontract pricing evaluation prior to awarding a contract to a Kuwaiti company to provide fuel. Defense auditors have issued an estimating system report that criticizes KBR's estimating procedures for not having that integration between the people issuing the purchase orders and contracts and the home office people who prepare the proposals.¹³

The House Committee on Government Reform is investigating allegations of waste, abuse, and profiteering related to the Army's contracts in Iraq. Mr. John Mancini, a former procurement employee of Halliburton, will testify that after being hired and deployed to Kuwait City in the spring of 2003, he noticed several irregularities in some KBR employees purchasing habits. His skill at buying goods and making sure government money was spent wisely was completely ignored. He noticed colleagues paid inflated cell phone fees and paid \$60 for rolls of duct tape. When he raised concerns over these issues, Halliburton sent in a team to prepare for government audits. According to Mr. Mancini, "The waste was unbelievable, this was pure negligence."¹⁴ The GAO is prepared to report its investigations found "a pattern of contractor management problems."¹⁵ Additionally they found "that the Army did not plan how to use LOGCAP effectively until after the fall of Baghdad, and did not limit spending on the contract until this spring (2004), after Halliburton's cost estimates increased from \$5.8 billion to \$8.6 billion."¹⁶

Another problem associated with the LOGCAP in OIF was the allegation of kickbacks. Halliburton has admitted that "two employees took kickbacks valued at \$6 million in return for awarding a Kuwait-based company with lucrative work supplying U.S. troops in Iraqi contracts."¹⁷ Once again, this vulnerability is due to the magnitude of the contract. The large geographic area it covers magnifies difficulty in contract management. Another problem encountered includes contract workers paid for non performance. Contract workers told members of the House Committee on Government Reform they witnessed misspending and

mismanagement by KBR, such as contractors abandoning \$85,000 trucks for minor problems and spending almost \$1 million to house employees at a Kuwait hotel against Army wishes.¹⁸

In certain parts of the world, the contractor may have difficulty in acquiring the proper types and quality of equipment. When this happens, the contractor must ship equipment into the area, sometimes competing directly with the military over the limited quantity of transport. Sometimes logistics contractors find it difficult to obtain qualified personnel. Local personnel may be plentiful, but they may lack the technical competence or skills required, especially for some types of advanced equipment. Other personnel constraints involve not only American holidays, but local holidays as well.¹⁹ The personnel and equipment issues were very prevalent during the first year of OIF. According to the GAO report, "most contract personnel interviewed prior to OIF indicated that they would remain in the event of war with Iraq. However, they cannot be ordered to remain in a hostile environment or to replace other contractors that choose not to deploy."²⁰ "Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a contractor will be willing to deploy to replace the original contractor."²¹ This issue surfaced during OIF when contractors refused to work when the situation became very hostile, causing the involuntary extension of several U.S. Army transportation units during OIF to mitigate the problem.

Another problem with contractor support is the increased number of civilian personnel on the battlefield. This increases the risk of non combatant deaths. As of 8 Nov 2004, "Fifty-five employees of Halliburton and its subcontractors have been killed in Iraq."²² And, the numbers are growing. "In recent months, the company's presence in Iraq has rapidly expanded. Halliburton has about 36,000 employees and contractors in Iraq, 8,000 more than it did six months ago."²³ Additionally, civilians are not bound by the same contract as soldiers and can refuse to work when the threat situation becomes unstable. As stated in a June 2003 GAO report, "contractor employees could become unavailable due to enemy activity or accidents."²⁴ This unavailability was a real problem in OIF.

The military is still obligated to provide security for the contractors, requiring dedicated combat resources sorely needed elsewhere. Conversely, CS and CSS units are capable of providing their own security. DoD Directive 4500.54 "requires all non-DoD personnel traveling under DoD sponsorship to obtain country clearance."²⁵ This was made painfully clear when Central Command refused to allow contracted master planners into Iraq, causing a 60 day delay in completion of the Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) installation master plan.

The military encountered confusion and problems supporting contractors in the following areas:

- Supplies - Joint Publication 3-11, includes a requirement that the military must provide mission-essential contractors with chemical and biological survival equipment and training.²⁶ We have to provide the equipment and train the contractors, but our soldiers already have the training and equipment.
- Medical support - The Navy has experienced problems with supporting contractors on deployed ships. Officials at the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command advised they were not sure if the Navy was authorized to provide medical treatment to their contractors deployed on ships.²⁷
- Loss of service – Contractors provide many services that keep military base camps operating, therefore, the Army must assure the protection of contractor operations and employees in hostile or hazardous areas. Army Field Manual 3-100.21 prescribes those local commanders must protect contractors and their employees. The Air Force policy memorandum stipulates the Air Force must provide or make available force protection commensurate with those provided to DoD civilian personnel.²⁸ This takes soldiers away from other valuable missions, but without soldiers providing the security it could result in the loss of support services provided by those contractors. Soldiers providing the same support are self securing; therefore, reducing the total security force required.
- Language - The DoD has no standard contract language related to the deployment and support of contractors supporting deployed forces.²⁹ This causes delays, confusion, financial resources and other extreme problems in contract management even for someone familiar with contracting. A GAO study concluded on the 4th Infantry Division's deployment to OIF discovered several contracts with no deployment language or vague deployment language.³⁰
- Security Access - Military units experienced numerous security problems in multiple locations. In Afghanistan, some third country nationals were prohibited on base during increased security measures. These individuals normally provide important services such as preparing food and providing sanitation services. In Kosovo, badges were issued at multiple locations and provided access to multiple bases, meaning a contractor could receive a badge at one site and come on to a different base without the commander's knowledge. In Bosnia, temporary badges

at Eagle Base had no pictures, allowing anyone to use the badge to gain access to the base.³¹

- Lack of control - Army policy requires contractors to follow all general orders and force protection policies of the local commander. These requirements were absent from some contract documents and most likely unenforceable. "In such situations, commanders may not have the ability to control contractor activities in accordance with general orders."³² This makes it difficult if not impossible to prevent contractors from breaking the rules.

Most of these problems would be minimized, if not eliminated, when soldiers provide the support.

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT PROBLEMS

Broad contract oversight is lacking in key areas, making it difficult for commanders to manage contractors effectively. The varying service policies cause a lack of understanding of contractual requirements, understandings, and obligations for both for the customer and the contractor. In all locations investigated except Bosnia, the commanders have difficulty maintaining visibility of all contract support at specific locations making it complicated for commanders to resolve issues concerning contractor support. Guidance from higher headquarters varies widely with many inconsistent mechanisms for managing the contractors and no standardization of contract language. Additionally, the decision to use contractors to provide support to a deployed location can be made by any number of 'requiring activities' both within and outside of the area of operations. In support of selected services in Bosnia alone, nine separate contracts from nine separate agencies, six in the U.S. and three in Germany, were used to acquire support (figure 1).³³

This situation creates challenges that hinder the efficient use of contractors and increases costs.³⁴ Commanders may also be responsible for providing contractor employees with certain benefits and entitlements included in their contracts. The ability to meet these requirements (providing chemical and biological protective gear, military escorts, billeting and medical support) is complicated by their lack of visibility over the totality of contractor presence. In addition, the commander is accountable for these contractors in the event of an attack on a base.³⁵




FIGURE 1. CONTRACTS FOR SELECTED SERVICES IN BOSNIA ARE AWARDED BY MANY DIFFERENT AGENCIES

In many instances, civilian contracting officers are not located at deployed locations. For the larger contracts such as LOGCAP and AFCAP where the military has hired DCMA to oversee contract performance,³⁶ there may not be enough contract monitors in place to ensure proper contract performance. Even the addition of contracting officer's representatives (COR) and contracting officer's technical representatives (COTR) to monitor contractor performance at deployed locations does not solve the problems. These individuals are not normally contracting specialists and serve as CORs as an additional duty. They can only monitor contract performance and have no ability to change anything affecting price, quality, quantity, delivery or other terms and conditions of the contract.³⁷ The GAO report highlighted some examples:

- An Air Force commander sent a contractor from Kuwait to Afghanistan without going through the appropriate contracting officer. The contractor was ultimately recalled to Kuwait because the contract contained no provision for support in Afghanistan.

- A Special Operations Command official told us commanders were unfamiliar with the DCMA and believed the agency represented the contractor and not the military.³⁸

The GAO report also found that the frequent rotation of military personnel into and out of a theater of operation resulted in a loss of continuity in the oversight process as incoming oversight personnel had to familiarize themselves with the new responsibilities.³⁹ DCMA did not always appoint COTRs who could have assisted DCMA in its quality assurance responsibilities. Recurring contractor problems such as cost reporting, difficulties with producing and meeting schedules, and weaknesses in purchasing system controls also made the LOGCAP contract more difficult to administer.⁴⁰

SUMMARY

DoD has the option of minimizing LOGCAP in high intensity conflict areas by adding CS and CSS units into both the AC and RC. DoD could and should continue to utilize LOGCAP; but only in smaller contingency operations, operations other than war and after stabilization in post high intensity conflict. Initially, soldiers are more rapidly deployable. When trained, equipped and notified properly, AC and RC units mobilize and deploy faster than contractors. Additionally, with soldiers, DoD has an individual trained to standard on a specific piece of equipment or job, giving DoD a known workforce capability. All soldiers are not only trained for their specialty, they are also trained to use weapons allowing them to self secure, thus minimizing security force requirements.

With the advent of additional support personnel back into the military, soldiers would be taking care of soldiers. These soldiers would all be trained to carry and use a weapon, without requiring the special permits required of contractors. With more soldiers and fewer contractors, the military would return to better construction standards. For example, the standards used for expedient troop housing in Iraq allowed the contractor to provide temporary housing with a maximum life expectancy of three years. With additional CS and CSS units, the military could have utilized local labor and constructed higher quality explosion resistant facilities in the same amount of time. These facilities would have a 20+ year life span, and when constructed to local design and standards, would make excellent facilities to hand over to the new Iraqi military and civilian authorities, thus gaining additional value for the operation.

The Army can add additional Contingency Contracting Officers into the military system without taking the entire burdensome general contractor to the fight. Military personnel with contracting and supervisory experience proved to be great combat multipliers in Iraq and

Afghanistan when these personnel coordinated local support contracts. Adding these personnel will cost money and combat positions. However, when one can assemble an eight member team consisting of "three contracting officers, two host nation interpreters, two transportation movement officers, and an administrative specialist," and provide contractor support during high intensity conflict, the Army achieves the same success without the ramifications of contractors on the battlefield.⁴¹

A significant portion of base camp construction in Iraq was accomplished by engineer and logistical personnel supervising local Iraqi contractors. This provided the same job related stimulation to the local economy without LOGCAP civilian personnel. The same was true for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where soldiers acquired the skills of local personnel to "obtain needed materials, services, and supplies not readily available through normal supply channels. In today's operational environment, contracted support is an integral, and often transparent, part of the military's day-to-day operations during deployments."⁴² This demonstrates how soldiers with the authority and local contractors can do it better than LOGCAP. In addition, these personnel can also monitor all prearranged logistical contracts.

Granted, adding support units back into the system would be difficult and expensive. However, we can add units into the RC for approximately one fourth the cost of adding units back into the AC. It is difficult to compare the cost of keeping military units versus contractors; therefore, an economic analysis would be required to validate the cost. In an effort to minimize the cost of the additional units, the RC units could train with their AC counterparts using the AC equipment. This would increase training and readiness levels while minimizing equipment requirements for the RC units. Another option would be to keep training sets of equipment at various mobilization stations throughout the U.S. for the units to conduct periodic training and pre deployment training. The RC units could then deploy either with leased equipment from the point of origin, or they could rotate and fall in on stay behind equipment.

OIF identified a need for additional CS and CSS units primarily to support high intensity combat operations. During my work in CJTF7, contractors refused to report to work or drive in Iraq on numerous occasions, compounding the support difficulties. The military was forced to solve this problem by extending five transportation and three engineer units. The final solution will require additional analysis to determine the proper number and type of units required. The decision to add units into the military, especially in the RC, will be a very politically sensitive issue based on the recent overextension of the RC.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on OIF and the current basis of allocation, the DoD should provide five full Army division sets, one Marine Expeditionary Force set and one Air Force Wing set of CS and CSS units to the AC. The DoD through the RC should field enough units to provide twice the CS and CSS requirements to support all additional Army, Marine and Air Force division sized units, including those units in the RC. DoD can provide equipment to half of the RC units and keep training sets for the other units at consolidated training locations. Since deployments occur over time, DoD will have adequate time to acquire additional equipment through leasing to support additional deploying units. This military will be larger than the one fielded now. However, DoD will have a trained and equipped force large enough to support one major regional high intensity conflict deployment. Plus, this size force will allow the DoD desired rotation of AC units once every three years and RC units once every five years, and support mobilization and deployment for a full scale conflict. DoD should continue to use logistics contracts to support only non-core functions, low threat contingency deployments and follow-on support in high intensity conflicts once hostilities decrease to the point of a safe and secure environment for non combatants.

CONCLUSION

Contractor shortcomings support increasing the numbers of CS and CSS units in the military and decreasing contract levels to smaller contingency/peacekeeping operations and minimal support in hostile areas. The military achieved great success in many areas of Iraq managing local contractors themselves. In areas too hostile for LOGCAP contractors, military support units maximized their capability by directly contracting for construction and services with local contractors. The soldiers directly supervised indigenous work crews inside base camps building facilities to high quality standards, better than what LOGCAP provided. This proved we can contract and supervise locally as well as any LOGCAP contractor.

Risk is inherent when relying on contractors to support deployed forces. DoD Instruction 3020.37 requires the services to determine which contracts provide essential services and either develop plans for continued provision of those services during crisis or assume the risk of not having the essential service. While most contractors would likely deploy or remain in a deployed location if needed, there are many other reasons contractors may not be available to provide essential services. Without a clear understanding of the consequences of not having the essential service available, the risks associated with the mission increase.⁴³

Contractors provided excellent support in relatively stable environments such as in the Balkans. Contractors provided base operations support services such as food, laundry,

recreational, construction and maintenance, road maintenance, waste management, fire-fighting, power generation, and water production and distribution services. Contractors also provided logistics support such as parts and equipment distribution, ammunition accountability and control, and port support activities as well as support to weapons systems and tactical vehicles.⁴⁴ This supports the contention that contractors can replace military units once the situation stabilizes. However, the U.S. military must maintain sufficient quantities of uniformed personnel to accomplish these missions until the situation stabilizes.

The military will continue to 'right size' itself for many years during the transformation from a threat based force to a capabilities based force. The military must include the proper levels of CS/CSS units to maintain responsiveness to fight and win the nations wars. No matter what the DoD does to make contract management easier, contractor related problems won't go away in high intensity conflict, we need additional CS and CSS units to support the military in high intensity conflict.

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²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17

²² STRATFOR, "Iraq: Halliburton Employees Killed." 8 November 2004. Available from <<http://www.stratfor.biz/>>; Internet; accessed 8 December 2004

²³ Simon Romero, "Halliburton Weighs Options On Bidding for Iraq Work," *The New York Times*, 8 Sep 2004, sec. C, p. 3

²⁴ United States General Accounting Office, *Military Operations; Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are not Addressed in DOD Plans*. 24 Jun 2003, p. 3

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33

³² *Ibid.*, p. 28

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 32

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ United States General Accounting Office, *Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight*. 21 Jul 2004, p. 5

⁴¹ "Contract Support for Operation Enduring Freedom." Army Logistician 35, (Mar/Apr 2003): 22-23

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ United States General Accounting Office, Military Operations; Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are not Addressed in DOD Plans. 24 Jun 2003, p. 35

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 7

ACRONYMS

AC – Active Component military forces
AFCAP – Air Force Contractor Augmentation Program
CONCAP – Construction Capabilities Contract
COR – Contracting Officer Representative
COTR – Contracting Officers Technical Representative
CS – Combat Support
CSS – Combat Service Support
DCMA – Defense Contracting Management Agency
DoD – Department of Defense
GAO – Government Accounting Office
HCSP – Human Capital Strategic Plan
KBR – Kellogg, Brown and Root
LOGCAP – Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
RC – Reserve Component military forces including all Reserve and National Guard
SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement

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